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INTRODUCTION

In any democratic society, government is concerned for the protection of the privacy of its citizens. As a means of implementing
*Of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars.
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this concern, the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution has stood as a bulwark against unwarranted governmental
intrusion into the daily affairs and activities of the people. Such
intrusion takes place in the form of a search and seizure. In order
not to unduly hamper effective law enforcement, however, but at
the same time to reasonably protect the individual from tyranny,
the amendment strikes a balance by prohibiting not all searches
and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable.'
Obviously, the right to be free from an unreasonable search
and seizure would be an empty protection without a means of enforcement. This means has been afforded by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the form of the exclusionary rule, which,
simply stated, forbids the admissibility in a criminal trial of the
fruits of an illegal search. The admissibility of these fruits, however, can be blocked
only upon "timely objection," 2 which usually
3
trial.
before
means
The vehicle for giving impetus to the exclusionary rule is a
procedural device 4 known as the motion to suppress. Unfortunately, as shall be seen, before a victim of an alleged illegal search
or seizure may object, he must establish the requisite standing. To
accomplish this, he runs the risk of exposing himself to self-incrimination, the jeopardy against which the barrier of the fifth amendment was erected. 5 It is to this issue, the later use at trial of suppressions hearing admissions, 6 that this article shall be directed; for,
1. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); State v. Davis, 50 N.J. 16, 21, 231 A.2d 793,
796 (1967); State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 77, 232 A.2d 141, 143 (1967).
2. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CRim. P. 41 (e); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-33f
(1958); PA. R. CRiM. P. 2001 (b).
4. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260, 264 (1960); State v.
Ferrara, 95 N.J. Super. 329, 333, 231 A.2d 224, 226 (1967); Edwards, Standing
to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471, 471-72
(1952).
5. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
6. There are three ways or forms in which a movant for suppression
can make damaging admissions, e.g., (1) in the motion itself; (2) in an
affidavit supporting the motion; and (3) in testimony given at a suppression
hearing. See discussion in Note, Standing To Object To An Unlawful
Search And Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488, 497, as well as the cases collected therein, id. at 502 n.61 (permitting the trial use of each of the forms).
The three forms collectively shall hereinafter be referred to as either
"suppression hearing admissions," "inculpatory statements," or "admissions."
A note of explanation concerning the use of supporting affidavits and
the obtainment of a suppression hearing is here in order. The use of supporting affidavits will be governed, if at all, by statute or rule of court.
Resorting to them, under federal procedure, is "never mandatory and seldom proper. . . ." United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 28 (N.D. Cal.
1955); see Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 761 (9th Cir. 1967). But see
United States v. Vomero, 6 F.R.D. 275, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 1946), where the court
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if it can be shown that the price an accused must pay for vindication
of his right of privacy is the forfeiture of his privilege against selfincrimination, then it may truly be said that the protection afforded
by the fourth amendment is but "a form of words."7 Particular attention will be directed to case law in this field, because there is no
governing federal statute and there does not appear to be any applicable state statute.8
held that a suppression motion predicated on any of the four grounds
enumerated in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e) (1), (3), (4), and (5) "should be"
supported by affidavit. Of course, an affidavit can do the movant no harm
and may prove to be of some assistance to the court. See United States v.
Privinzini, 6 F.R.D. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). This is especially so where only a
question of law, as distinguished from one of fact, is involved. United
States v. Warrington, supra at 28.
When disputed issues of fact are involved, however, the movant must
be careful not to rely exclusively upon affidavits, for they are no substitute
for competent proof. Cohen v. United States, supra at 761.
To obtain a hearing on the motion, the moving papers, including affidavits, must be "sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural,
to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented. If
the allegations are sufficient, and factual issues are raised, a hearing is
required." Id. If not, or if the allegations of the motion are simply in the
words of a suppression statute without any supporting detail, then the
movant will be entitled to no hearing. Id.; see United States v. Tucker,
262 F. Supp. 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Stonehill, 254 F.
Supp. 1003, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Casanova, 213 F. Supp.
654, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Stein, 53 F. Supp. 911, 912 (W.D.
N.Y. 1943), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Minneci,
142 F.2d 428, 429 (2d Cir. 1944). In short, evidentiary hearings will not be
held as a matter of course, but only when a movant alleges sufficient facts
which, if established, would require suppression. Grant v. United States,
282 F.2d 165, 170 (2d Cir. 1960). Nor will they be held where the only affidavit filed is one prepared and signed by counsel, and there has been no
showing of unavailability on the part of the accused. See United States
v. Williams, 379 F.2d 319, 320 (2d Cir. 1967).
Finally, although the Cohen court recognized that "[siuppression
may be improper for a reason of law appearing on the face of the motion,"
378 F.2d at 760, it is conceivable that a movant may be afforded a second
opportunity for a hearing, provided he can supplement sufficiently his
supporting allegations or produce the requisite evidence at trial, Id. See
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e).
7. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
8. Even if there were such a statute, it would have to measure up to
fourth amendment standards, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964);
Ker. v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963); United States ex rel. Mancini v.
Rundle, 337 F.2d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 1964); Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp.
857, 868 (D.N.H. 1965), and not violate the federal privilege against selfincrimination, United States ex rel. Laino v. Warden, 246 F. Supp. 72, 78
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 355 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Interborough Delicatessen Dealers Ass'n, 235 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
A concomitant rule is that variations of wording in the federal and state
constitutions will not lead to differing interpretations of the principle embodied in the privilege. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.6
(1966); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 584-85 (1892); State v. White,
426 P.2d 796, 797 (Ariz. 1967); 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2263, at 378 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE, except when reference
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EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE QUESTION OF STANDING

The Basis for the Rule and the Irrelevancy of Standing

The exclusionary rule 9 "is a means for making effective the
protection of privacy,"' 1 which stands "at the core of the Fourth
Amendment."" As such, it is "an essential part of the right to
privacy."' 2 If this were not so, "the assurance against unreasonable . . . searches and seizures would be . . . valueless and undeserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
3
liberties.'
In Linkletter v. Walker,14 the Supreme Court adopted a general deterrence rationale as the basis for the rule. 15 This result
had been foreshadowed in Elkins v. United States, 6 where the Court
emphasized that the rule of exclusion "is calculated to prevent, not
to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.' 7 In Tehan v. United States ex
rel. Shott,1s the Court observed that deterrence, as well as effective
enforcement of the fourth amendment, was the "prime purpose"' 9
of the rule. In view of this rationale, it is difficult to see why
there should be any special requirements for standing to complain
about a given search or seizure. If evidence is obtained in violation
of the amendment, that fact alone should be determinative of the
issue of suppression and should make the issue of standing irrelevant.2 0 Since the purpose of the amendment is to protect not only
is made to the third edition]. In short, the "various phrasings have a
common conception, in respect to the form of the protected disclosure."
Id. (emphasis in original).
9. Although the rule operates to exclude illegally obtained or seized
evidence, it does not do so because such evidence is considered to be
irrelevant and unreliable. Quite to the contrary, such evidence is deemed
relevant and reliable. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638, 639 (1965);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 239 (1960);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 340 (1939); United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 911 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966). In fact, this is all but conceded by the mere
filing of a motion to suppress, It is certainly doubtful that a defense
attorney would bother to suppress or exclude irrelevant evidence.
10. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
11. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
12. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); see Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
13. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
14. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
15. Id. at 636-37.
16. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
17. Id. at 217.
18. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
19. Id. at 413.
20. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955);
Comment, Standing To Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure,
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individual privacy but that of society as a whole,2 1 that right can
best be implemented by requiring the exclusion of all illegally
of a particularized inobtained evidence regardless of the absence
2
vasion of an accused's realm of privacy.
Although the logic of this argument seems inescapable, California has been to date the only jurisdiction which has adopted
it.2 3 In all other jurisdictions, a movant for suppression may not
rely for standing solely on the claimed illegal activity of law enforcement officials. He must meet, independently of such conduct,
certain criteria before he will be heard to complain, in spite of the
fact that these criteria cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with the
deterrence theory of exclusion. 24 Consideration must be given
these criteria, for it is they that have most effectively exposed a
suppression movant to the dilemma of either vindicating his right
to privacy at the risk of incriminating himself, or foregoing this
right in order to preserve the privilege.
B.

The Requirements for Standing

On at least two occasions the Supreme Court has declared that
before a movant for suppression will be permitted to object to an
unreasonable search or seizure, he must show a personal interest
either in the premises searched or in the property seized. 25 Prior
to 1960, this requirement of personal interest posed an agonizing
dilemma for those accused of possessory-contraband crimes-those
in which mere unexplained possession is sufficient to convict. 26
34 U. Car. L. REv. 342, 356-58, 361, 365-66 (1967); Note, supra note 6, at
519-20.
21. Mascolo, The Role of Functional Observation in the Law of Search
and Seizure: A Study in Misconception, 71 DiCm. L. REV. 379, 427-28 (1967).
22. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955);
Comment, supra note 20, at 365; Note, supra note 6, at 520. For a position
endorsing continued reliance upon the requirement of standing see Weeks,
Standing To Object In The Field Of Search And Seizure, 6 Amz. L. REV.
64, 78-81 (1964).
23. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955).
24. See discussion in Comment, supra note 20, at 356-58. See also
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 759-60, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955), where a
strong argument is made by Justice (now Chief Justice) Traynor for the
proposition that standing requirements are logically relevant only when the
basis for exclusion is premised upon the theory of incrimination.
25. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963); Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The basis for the rule is that
fourth-amendment rights are personal and can only be personally claimed
or enforced. E.g., United States v. Liguori, 373 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 222-23 (2d Cir. 1966); Williams v.
United States, 323 F.2d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906
(1964); McChan v. State, 238 Md. 149, 158, 207 A.2d 632, 638 (1965). Of
course, the same rule applies to other constitutional rights. See Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
26. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 493 (1963); Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1960).
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Judge Learned Hand posed the dilemma in these terms:
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners,
or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once
to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils
of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come
as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail
to cast them without question. The petitioners at bar
shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged to
choose one horn of the dilemma."7
Because of this rationale, a movant for suppression who failed to
allege either ownership or possession of property seized, or a possessory interest
in the premises searched, lacked the requisite stand28
ing to object.

So matters stood until 1960, when the Supreme Court decided
Jones v. United States. 29 Jones, marking the first time the Court
seriously directed itself to the issue of standing, involved a possessory-contraband prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics. The
critical issue presented for the Court's determination was whether
petitioner possessed sufficient standing to object to the search and
seizure that led to his prosecution.
Prior to trial, petitioner filed a motion to suppress, which
was successfully challenged by the prosecution for lack of standing
because petitioner had alleged neither ownership of the property
seized nor an interest in the apartment searched greater than that
of an invitee or guest. In reversing the decisions of the lower
courts that petitioner lacked the required standing, the Supreme
Court, noting that the issue of standing had to be decided with
reference to rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
proceeded to review in detail the requirements of 41 (e) and the
purpose of the exclusionary rule. While conceding that a "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" 30 must ordinarily be
a "victim of an invasion of privacy," 31 because the rule of exclusion
"is a means for making effective the protection of privacy," 32 the
Court recognized that a special problem was presented in this type
of prosecution, in which mere unexplained possession of the contraband seized would suffice to convict; for if the movant sought
to comply with the conventional requirements of standing, his ef27. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932). One scholar
has described the tone of this passage as being "almost gleeful." Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L.
REV. 471, 486 (1952).
28. United States v. Eversole, 209 F.2d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1954); Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236, 237, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1946); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932); see Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 262-63 (1960).
29. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e).
31. 362 U.S. at 261.
32. Id.
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forts would contribute to his own conviction. 3 Rejecting the inescapability of Judge Hand's dilemma, the Court refused to acknowledge the requirements of standing that the dilemma presupposed. Rather, it felt that when the government is prosecuting
for illegal possession, that fact alone is sufficient to confer standing. The Court reasoned that it would be unfair to permit the
government to seek conviction for possession while allowing it to
successfully block suppression for lack of the requisite possessory
34
interest to establish standing.
As a separate basis for their decision, the Court, observing that
"[e]ven were this not a prosecution turning on illicit possession,
the legally requisite interest in the premises was here satisfied, ' ' s
held that "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs
may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when
its fruits are proposed to be used against him."36
C.

Some Problems Created by Jones

Although Jones made a significant inroad into the prior rigidlyadhered-to standing requirements, it has not been free of controversy. In the first place, implicit in the Court's opinion is the assumption that suppression hearing admissions are admissible at
trial.8 T This is apparent not only from the Court's discussion but
from its very ruling; for if not, there would have been little, if any,
need for either. The existence of the dilemma must presuppose
the use at trial of suppression hearing admissions, for the Court
would not have had to frame a rule to circumvent the dilemma if
such use was impermissible. Although the logic of this argument
appears to be convincing, it has been diluted to some extent by the
Court's observation that the use at trial of such admissions "is
by no means an inevitable holding.""s
In the second place, Jones abstained from any discussion of the
fifth-amendment implications arising from the prior requirements
for standing, and which are inherent in the trial use of suppression
hearing admissions. Rather than meet the issue squarely, the Court
chose to frame a rule peculiarly applicable to the facts of the case
under review. Thus, in all succeeding prosecutions for illegal
possession, it would not be necessary for a movant to face the
33. Id. at 261-62.
34. Id. at 263-64.
35. Id. at 263.
36. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
37. "He [defendant] has been faced ... with the chance that the
allegations made on the motion to suppress may be used against him at
the trial .. " Id. at 262. This assumption might have stemmed from the
Court's reading of several decisions that had recently appeared in the
District of Columbia Circuit, where Jones originated. See discussion in
Note, supra note 6, at 497 n.34.
38. 362 U.S. at 262 (emphasis added).
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dilemma posed by Judge Hand. But the rules announced in Jones
would not necessarily obviate the dilemma in any other type of
prosecution.
It is this failure that has given rise to a third problem, namely,
the scope of Jones. Is it limited to the type of prosecution there
involved, or does it extend to all criminal prosecutions? Also, does
it apply to state as well as federal cases, or only to the latter?3"
These are questions which have generated confusion not only
among the courts, 40 but also among the commentators. 41 Although
it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the lower court decisions which have grappled with these problems, it has been deemed
necessary to alert the practitioner to their existence in order to
show that the dilemma still exists for some defendants and their
attorneys, and will continue until the Supreme Court passes upon
the issues left unanswered by Jones.
Regardless of the scope of Jones, the fact remains that it was
concerned with admissions made in pleadings to effect standing.
Its more liberal standing requirements have nothing to do with
oral testimonial incrimination. While standing is important for one
to be heard, its obtainment will not grant suppression. The heavy
burden of persuasion carried by a movant may not be satisfied, in
39. In this regard, it should be remembered that the standing requirements formulated by the Court in Jones were based upon its interpretation
of rule 41 (e). 362 U.S. at 260. Therefore, it is doubtful whether they do

apply to state prosecutions. See Note, supra note 6, at 491.
40. For decisions limiting Jones to possessory-contraband prosecutions see United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154, 161 (3d Cir.), cert. granted,
385 U.S. 810 (1966); United States v. Mancusi, 261 F. Supp. 579, 582 (W.D.
N.Y. 1966); for those appearing to favor this interpretation see Bullock v.
United States, 368 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1966); Elbel v. United States, 364
F.2d 127, 137 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 S. Ct. 726 (1967); Geurkink
v. United States, 354 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1965) (dictum); McChan v.
State, 238 Md. 149, 158, 207 A.2d 632, 638 (1965). For cases appearing to
extend Jones beyond possessory-contraband situations see Henzel v. United
States, 296 F.2d 650, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Birrell, 242
F. Supp. 191, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680,
683 (10th Cir. 1962). For an excellent summary of current federal law
regarding standing requirements see United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206,
222 (2d Cir. 1966), where the court interpreted the Supreme Court's rulings
on standing to mean that an accused will be heard to complain about an
alleged unreasonable search or seizure only in the following situations: He
must allege and show that either (1) he has been a victim of a search or
seizure; or (2) he owned, leased or possessed either the premises searched
or the property seized; or (3) he was present on the premises searched
with the consent or permission of the owner, lessee, or possessor; or (4) the
property seized was illegally possessed contraband; or (5) the property
seized was either owned or possessed by him and was stored on a third
person's premises to which he had lawful access.
41. See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 491; Weeks, supra note 22, at
74-75; Annot., 4 L. Ed. 2d 1999, 2008, 2009 (1960). For an interpretation
limiting Jones to possessory-contraband cases see Note, The Exclusionary
Rule And The Question Of Standing, 50 GEO. L.J. 585, 598-99 (1962);
Annot., 4 L. Ed. 2d at 2009.
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a given case, in the absence of his own testimony. This becomes
particularly apparent where a judge observes, in denying the motion, that the police officer's version of what happened went undisputed by the accused. Thus, no matter what interpretation is
placed upon Jones, the dilemma involving oral testimonial incrimination will remain as strong as ever.

II.
A.

THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Its Scope

Although the fifth amendment speaks of "any criminal case,"
the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination is broader than
the literal meaning of these words. The privilege has been held
to extend to "any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative
or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory .... -42 Succinctly put,
the protection afforded by the privilege
"is as broad as the mischief
' 48
against which it seeks to guard.
In order not to impede this protection, the Supreme Court has
insisted not only that "the scope of the privilege is comprehensive," 44 but also that it be accorded a liberal construction. 45 In
line with this, the Court recently commented upon the availability
of the privilege in these terms:
[T] he availability of the privilege does not turn upon the
type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but
upon the nature of the statement or admission and the
exposure which it invites. The privilege may ...
6
4be
claimed . . . if the statement is or may be inculpatory.
42. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White); accord, Application of Gault, 87
S. Ct. 1428, 1454 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). For a
specific listing of such proceedings see Note, Supreme Court Delineates The
Relationship Between The Fourth And Fifth Amendments, 1967 DUKE L.J.
366, 371.
43. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
459-60 (1966); see Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
44. Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1454 (1967).
45. Cases cited note 43 supra. Although its construction is liberal, its
enforcement is narrowly personal. See, e.g., Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 107 (1961);
Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314 (1912); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 69 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896); State v. Crepeault,
229 A.2d 245, 247 (Vt. 1967).
46. Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1455 (1967) (emphasis added).
This concept of the scope of the protection was forewarned some years
ago in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951):
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would
in themselves support a conviction ...
but likewise embraces those
which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute the claimant ....
But this protection must be confined
to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend
danger from a direct answer.
Id. at 486 (emphasis added); accord, State v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 232;
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Although the scope and construction of the privilege are both
comprehensive and broad, to ensure its reaching "an accused's
communications, whatever form they might take,"47 it has never
been given the full application which the values it helps to protect
might suggest.4 s In short, it broadly applies to only one type of
communication-testimonial, either in oral or documentary form. 49
This directs our inquiry to the privilege's meaning and the values
which it seeks to protect.
B. Its Purpose and Meaning
The privilege against self-incrimination has always enjoyed
an exalted status in our constitutional scheme. It has been referred
to as "the essential mainstay of our adversary system";50 "one of
the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen"; 51 and "one of our
nation's most cherished principles. 8' 2 Its basic purpose has been
to protect our criminal justice from degenerating into an inquisitorial system of procedure. 53 The policy considerations underlying
the privilege have been eloquently stated by Mr. Justice Goldberg:
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important advance in the development of our liberty-'one of
the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized.'

". ..

It reflects many of our fundamental values

and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-

143 N.W.2d 69, 74 (1966); Commonwealth v. Carrera, 424 Pa. 551, 553, 227
A.2d 627, 629 (1967).
47. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966) (emphasis
added). This will include any oral or physical evidence which communicates an accused's beliefs, thoughts, or knowledge. Note, supra note 42,
at 380.
48. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966).
49. See Gilbert v. California, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1953 (1967); United States
v. Wade, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1930 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
761, 763-64 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910);
DeAntonio v. Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320, 323 (D. Mass. 1967); 8 WIGMORE § 2264,
at 363-64 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore has defined a testimonial communication
as one "involving [the accused's] consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it ..
" Id. § 2265, at 386. A documentary
communication will usually take the form of compliance with a subpoena
to produce one's papers. Cf. Schmerber v. California, supra at 764; Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633, 634-35 (1886).
It lies outside the province of this article to discuss and analyze the
types of real or physical evidence to which the privilege has no relevance.
For a summary of such evidence see Schmerber v. California, supra at 764;
Gilbert v. California, supra at 1953; United States v. Wade, supra at 1930;
People v. Ellis, 65 A.C. 571, 576, 421 P.2d 393, 395-96, 397, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385,
387-88, 389 (1966); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352, 230 A.2d 384, 389 (1967).
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
51. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966).
53. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).

Fall 1967]

SUPPRESSION HEARING ADMISSIONS

11

accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal
justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of
fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load" . . .; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life" . . .; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a
shelter4 to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."5

Although the privilege protects against testimonial communications, 5 the critical requirement of compulsion is necessary to
bring it into play. Certainly an accused has the right to testify
and may voluntarily do so. When he does, however, he completely waives the privilege and may be cross-examined to the same
extent as any other witness. 5 But the prosecution may not exert
any pressure to force such testimony, 57 and it will never be per54. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See
also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
55. See authorities listed in note 49 supra.
56. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154, 155-56, 157 (1958);
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951); Raffel v. United
States, 271 U.S. 494, 497, 499 (1926); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S, 301,
305 (1895); State v. Keating, 151 Conn. 592, 597, 200 A.2d 724, 727 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 963 (1965); State v. Reid, 146 Conn. 227, 232, 149 A.2d
698, 700 (1959); Jones v. Commonwealth, 327 Mass. 491, 493, 99 N.E.2d 456,

457 (1951). That the privilege may be waived cannot be seriously doubted.
See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931); Powers v.
United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314 (1912); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597
(1896); State v. Crepeault, 229 A.2d 245, 247 (Vt. 1967).
Not only may such cross-examination take the form of impeachment
of credibility, Reagan v. United States, supra at 305; Raffel v. United
States, supra at 497, 499; Brown v. United States, supra at 154 (dictum),
but it may also explore everything relevant to the examination in chief,
Brown v. Walker, supra at 597; Powers v. United States, supra at 315; People v. Ing, 65 A.C. 650, 422 P.2d 590, 594, 595, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906, 907
(1967); People v. Perez, 65 A.C. 662, 422 P.2d 597, 599, 601, 55 Cal. Rptr.
909, 911, 913 (1967); Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266, 276 (1869), even though
this line of inquiry may expose the accused to incriminatory involvement
in a collateral offense for which he could still be prosecuted, Johnson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 189, 192, 195-96 (1943); Carpenter v. United States,
246 F.2d 565, 569-70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959). For an
analysis of the permissible scope of such cross-examination see 8 WIGMORE
§ 2276, at 459-75.
57. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1953 (1967); United
States v. Wade, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1930 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 761 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906); 8 WIGMORE § 2264, at 363-64 (3d ed.
1940). Nor may it impose a penalty for a refusal to testify. See Griffin v.
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simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth."58
Although the Supreme Court has made repeated reference59 to
the element of compulsion, it has never rendered or attempted a
definitive concept of the term. The closest it has probably come
to such a concept was in Holt v. United States,60 where Mr. Justice
Holmes conceived of compulsion as "the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort [testimonial] communications .

. . ."G'

Be-

cause of the difficulty engendered by nebulous conceptions of the
term, it might be better to seek a concrete meaning from the word
with which it is most closely associated-the verb "compel." Here
the results are more rewarding: Webster's Dictionary defines
"compel" to mean "[t] o drive or urge with force, or irresistibly; to
62
constrain; oblige; necessitate, whether by physical or moral force."
The privilege, then, standing as the chief guardian of our accusatorial system of justice, seeks to protect an individual from
any necessity, prompted by physical or moral force and compulsion,
to incriminate himself by comunicating in testimonial form any
fact which will either directly establish his guilt or which "might
constitute an essential link in a chain of evidence by which guilt
can be established."6
III.

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS-A NOT SO
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP

Much has been made of the "intimate relation" 64 between the
fourth and fifth amendments, and the Supreme Court has consistCalifornia, 380 U.S. 609, 613, 614, 615 (1965); Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F.
Supp. 673, 678 (E.D. La. 1967); United States ex Tel. Smith v. Brierly, 267
F. Supp. 274, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
59. See authorities listed note 57 supra.
60. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
Holt was characterized in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966), as "[t]he leading case [on the privilege
against self-incrimination] in this Court ..
"
61. 218 U.S. at 252-53 (emphasis added). Wigmore argues in terms
of some attempt or demand to secure a communication-written, oral, or
otherwise-before the required element of compulsion can be satisfied.
8 WIGMORE § 2265, at 386. Webster's defines the term as an "[a]ct of
compelling, or state of being compelled." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIcnioNARY 551 (2d ed. unabr. 1960). While the privilege applies to an
accused being compelled to testify against himself, the compulsion required
will extend to any link of a "testimonial or communicative nature" that
will "otherwise provide" the prosecution with incriminating evidence.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (emphasis added).
62. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 544
(emphasis added).
63. Commonwealth v. Carrera, 424 Pa. 551, 553, 227 A.2d 627, 629
(1967); accord, Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951); State
v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 232, 143 N.W.2d 69, 74 (1966).
64. The phrase was first used in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
633 (1886).
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ently endorsed this view.6 5 Although there can be little doubt
that a viable relationship exists between the two, it is not derived
from their basic character.0 5 Rather, it is an intimacy springing
from the fact that both amendments seek to protect the privacy of
the individual as a source of evidence.6 ' While the fourth extends
65. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365
(1959); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
33-34 (1925); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1921); Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921); Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633, 635 (1886). For critical comment on this
claimed intimacy see LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT:

A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 58-60 (1966); 8 WIG-

§ 2184a, at 32, § 2264, at 381n.4; Chafee, The Progress of the Law,
1919-1922, 35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 697-98 (1922); Note, Evidentiary Searches:
The Rule And The Reason, 54 GEO. L.J. 593, 597-99 (1966); Comment, The
Fourth And Fifth Amendments-Dimensions Of An "Intimate Relationship," 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 857, 863-66 (1966).
The doctrine of interrelationship between the two amendments springs
from a misreading by Mr. Justice Bradley, the author of Boyd, of Lord
Camden's opinion in the celebrated case of Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils.
K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765), where, in
inveighing against the use of the general warrant to search among a man's
private papers for seditious libel, Lord Camden emphasized the self-incrimination analogy. In each instance both the innocent and the guilty
would be harmed-in the case. of the general warrant, because the basis
for its issuance was mere suspicion; in the case of self-incrimination, because a false confession could be forcibly extracted from an innocent as
well as a guilty individual. 19 Howell's St. Tr. at 1073-74. For an analysis
of this misreading of Entick see LANDYNSKI, supra at 59-60.
66. "The different historical origins of the two privileges demonstrate
their different character. They are complementary, not duplicates. The
Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the home; the Fifth protects
against legal inquisition." LANDYNSKI, supra note 65, at 59; see People v.
Trent, 228 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ill.
App. 1967).
67. In Warden v. Hayden, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1648 (1967), the Court, relying
upon Schmerber, noted that since certain items of clothing seized from
defendant were not testimonial or communicative in nature, their introduction into evidence would not violate the. privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, it felt that it was not required to "consider whether
there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them
from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure." Id. at 1648
(emphasis added). The clear import of this decision is that any item of
evidence, the use of which would do violence tol the privilege, lies outside
the pale of a reasonable search and seizure. In short, the fruits of any
search which are violative of the privilege will be considered the product
of unreasonable search activity. This will mean that search activity which
invades the province of the fifth will be struck down under the fourth,
even though in every other respect such activity meets- the requirements
of reasonable conduct under the latter; the unreasonableness of this type
of search activity will be measured solely by the presence of infringement
upon the privilege. This would appear to reaffirm Boyd's holding that the
fruits of an unreasonable search and seizure can have the effect of compelling a man to incriminate himself. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630, 633, 635 (1886); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
MORE
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a broad blanket of privacy over the individual 8 the fifth seeks to
delineate one aspect of that privacy. 9 The ambit of the privacyprotection afforded by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
covers not only "uncommunicated thoughts" but also the "com' 70
pelled production of private papers and documents.
Although each amendment must be interpreted with due regard to the demands of the other,71 they bear little relevance to
each other in their immediate operative effect. It can be strongly
argued 72 that resort to the fifth-amendment privilege in searchand-seizure cases is neither proper nor necessary. The reasons for
this are threefold. First, the fifth involves coercive action that
compels an individual to incriminate himself. This element of
coercion is not present in search-and-seizure activity, where the
victim of the search has no control, takes no action except in the
case of a consent, and is rarely compelled to do anything. Secondly, the fifth serves as a barrier against testimonial or communicative compulsion. The fourth, on the other hand, is not concerned with testimonial activity, because the evidence sought in a
search is physical or real and is taken by official action, and not
revealed by the victim. Finally, although both amendments seek
to guarantee to the individual a preserve for privacy against official conduct or action, the ambit of preservation is less extensive under the fifth, which
applies only to invasions of privacy that
73
compel incrimination.
Chief Justice Weintraub has put the contrast between the two
amendments in these terms:
Indeed, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are incompatiible in their immediate operative effect. Whereas the Fifth
Amendment forbids the use of any force whatever to compel a person to testify or to produce evidence of his wrong,
the Fourth permits the use of all the strength of government
to extract from a man's possession things which will convict
68. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946); Mascolo, InterSpousal Consent To Unreasonable Searches And Seizures: A Constitutioral Approach, 40 CONN. B.J. 351, 383-85 (1966); id., The Role Of Functional Observation In The Law Of Search And Seizure: A Study In
Misconception, 71 DiCK. L. REV. 379, 419, 427-28 (1967).
69. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629, 630, 633-35, 637 (1886);
Comment, supra note 65, at 857-58, 859, 863-66; Note, supra note 42, at
379n.88; cf. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946).
70. People v. Ellis, 65 A.C. 571, 421 P.2d 393, 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385,
388 (1966); see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629, 630, 633-35, 637
(1886); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) ; Note, supra note 42, at 379 n.88.
71. See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930); Edwards, supra note 27,
at 487.
72. And it has been. E.g., Comment, supra note 65, at 864-66.

73. See

LANDYNSKI,supra note

65, at 59.
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In short, while the Fifth Amendment shields the

person of the individual in unqualified terms, the Fourth
Amendment affords no such protection for his possessions
or even his person if he resists the search, but rather,
recognizing that possessions may be seized by might, seeks
to spell out limitations which will strike a fair balance between a man's privacy in his things and the duty of government to protect all citizens from criminal conduct....
[I]t is not apparent how the Fifth Amendment can make
illegal a search and seizure which the Fourth Amendment
permits. The Fourth has its own expressed limitations upon
search and seizure; there is no reason to suppose the framers of the Amendments intended to imply74 through the Fifth
an additional limitation upon the Fourth.
In contrasting the major operative functions of the two amendments, the purpose has not been to imply a reduction in scope of
the protection offered by either. Rather, the intention has been
to show that each amendment has an operative force of its own,
and that separate consideration will not reduce the effectiveness
of either. 75 To show that a somewhat tenuous interdependence
exists will prove beneficial apropos the use at trial of suppression
hearing admissions; for what is at stake there is not a claimed violation of the fourth amendment, but of the privilege itself, which
in the setting of a hearing to suppress has an existence all its own.
The privilege will or will not exist and will or will not be violated,
regardless of the outcome of the hearing, and irrespective of the
legality or illegality of the search conduct complained of.
IV. THE
A.

USE AT TRIAL OF SUPPRESSION HEARING ADMISSIONS

Introduction

The problem of standing and the not-broadly-based relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments have been analyzed.
It is now pertinent to discuss the effect, if any, of the requirements
for standing upon the privilege against self-incrimination. Here,
there exists only a causal relationship between the two amendments-one triggered by the mechanics of a motion to suppress.
It will be important to keep this relationship in mind when examining the cases that have based their decisions on the outcome of
the suppression hearings.
Two types of cases have passed upon this issue-those that
74. State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 509-10, 213 A.2d 185, 187-88 (1965).
Bisaccia did recognize, however, that the relationship, if any, will apply to
general searches among private papers. Id. at 511, 213 A.2d at 188-90. The
unconditional aspect of this reasoning has been somewhat weakened by the
later case of Warden v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1648 (1967), where the
Court clearly recognized that a search which invaded the privacy protected

by the fifth would be struck down as unreasonable under the fourth.
75.

See discussion in Comment, supra note 65, at 865-66.
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have unconditionally 76 permitted trial use, and those that have
qualifiedly permitted (or denied) such use. It should be borne
in mind, in analyzing these cases, that although standing requirements in possessory-contraband cases have been relaxed, a movant
for suppression remains vulnerable to self-incrimination.

B.

Authorities UnconditionallyPermittingUse at Trial

Thet leading case allowing the unconditional use at trial of suppression hearing admissions is Heller v. United States, 7 in which
the accused was convicted of violating the National Prohibition
Act. He filed a motion to suppress and testified at the hearing
that the house which was searched was his residence. The motion to suppress was denied, and his suppression hearing testimony
78
was admitted against him at trial.
In sustaining on appeal the admissibility at trial of such testimony, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that if the accused had made
the admission out of court, it would have been admissible; therefore, the same rule should apply to one made in court under oath.
Furthermore, he was not compelled to testify at the hearing any
more than he would have been at trial. His testimony was voluntary, and could even have been used at trial for impeachment
purposes if he had elected to testify and had contradicted his
admission of ownership.79
The court's reasoning was that if. there
were a second trial of the same case, any admissions the accused
made as a witness in the first trial, could be there shown against

him, even though he elected not to testify. Hence, "[h] aving voluntarily become a witness upon one issue in the case, what he
there testified may thereafter be shown against him upon trial of
any other issue therein."8 0
76. As shall be seen, there exists some disagreement among' the
authorities as to whether the leading case: in this category is really unqualified'
77. 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U..S 567. (1932).
78. At the time it was offered at trial, this testimony was the only
evidence to show Heller's connection with the house searched' Id. at 629.
79. Id. But use for impeachment purposes does not flow from the
fact that suppression hearing testimony is "voluntary." For the reasons
why, and the conditions under which, such use is permitted see Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).; United States v.. Curry, 358 F.2d 904,
910-911, 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1960); People v. Luna,
37 Ill. 2d 299, 306, 226 N.E.2d 586, 589-90 (1967). See also Woody v. United
States, 379 F.2d 130, 132 (D.C. Cir.. 1-967)..
80. 57 F.2d at 629. While it is true that testimony given in a prior
criminal case is admissible on a retrial of that cause, United States v. Birnbaum, 373 F.2d. 250, 264 (2d Cir. 1967); 1 UNDUiiLL, EVIDENCE § 237, at
578-79 (5th ed. 1956), this is because the prior testimony has effectively
waived the privilege, e.g., Yates v. Breazeale, 266 ,F: Supp. 360, 366. (N.D.
Miss. 1967); State v. Bailey, 426 P.2d 988, 992 (Wash. 1967)'. The same: is
true of a plea of guilty at an earlier trial. Yates v. -Breazeale, supra at 366.
But in none of these situations is the witness testifying in an attempt to
protect his constitutional rights. Therefore, the analogy posed by the court
was without merit.
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In a separate opinion 8 ' taking exception to the court's ruling,
but joining in the affirmance of conviction because of other evidence conclusively establishing guilt, Judge Evans argued that it
was necessary for the accused to move to suppress in order to protect himself from evidence claimed to have been illegally seized;
and, having made the motion, he bore the burden to prove the
truth of its allegations by testimony. In disagreeing with the majority's assertion that the accused voluntarily testified at the hearing, Judge Evans reasoned that the testimony was offered solely
to protect the accused's rights under the fourth amendment. If
such testimony can come only from "the lips of the accused," then
it, as well as8 2any admissions in the motion itself, should not be used
against him.

In United States v. Garrett, 3 a prosecution for bank robbery,
defendant took the stand at a suppression hearing and admitted
ownership of a suitcase containing incriminating evidence which
was seized in the home of a co-defendant's mother. At trial, the
court permitted, over timely objection, the transcript of this testimony to be read to the jury.
Defendant claimed on appeal that the trial use of this admission
constituted a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination
and a denial of due process. In rejecting this argument, the Seventh
Circuit observed that it was not necessary for defendant to have
testified to establish ownership of the suitcase,8 4 there being available to him a number of alternative methods8 5 for accomplishing
81. 57 F.2d at 629-30.
82. Id. at 629-30. Unfortunately, the thrust of the argument made by
Judge Evans was against a claimed infringement of the exclusionary rule,
and not of the privilege against self-incrimination. He rested his claim of
infringement upon an interpretation of the majority opinion permitting unconditional use at trial of suppression hearing admissions. Accord, State v.
Portee, 46 N.J. 239, 241-42, 216 A.2d 227, 229 (1966); cf. United States v.
Garrett, 371 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. granted sub nom. Simmons
v. United States, 388 U.S. 906 (1967). But see Fowler v. United States, 239
F.2d 93, 95 (1Oth Cir. 1956); Casias v, People, 415 P.2d 344, 348 (Colo.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 979 (1966), which both interpreted the majority holding in Heller as being conditioned upon -the proper denial of suppression.
Furthermore, Judge Evans premised much of his argument upon a set of

facts which assumed the existence of illegal search activity. 57 F.2d at 630.

83. 371 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. granted sub nom. Simmons v.
United States, 388 U.S. 906 (1967).
84. Note the similarity between this approach and that adopted by
Judge Evans in his separate opinion in Heller, where he argued that if
testimony conferring standing "can only come from the lips of the accused, then his testimony ... should not be used against him." 57 F.2d at
630. This would seem to bear out the belief that what most concerned
Judge Evans was the apparently unconditional endorsement of trial use
contained in the language of the majority opinion.
85. While the court listed, as representative of such methods, "testimony or documentary evidence of a purchase thereof by the alleged owner,
open possession and the use thereof by him," 371 F.2d at 298 (emphasis
added), it appeared to have overlooked the fact that even if defendant had
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standing. In any event, the choice of a solution to the dilemma
presented-risking self-incrimination to obtain suppression-was
for defendant's attorney, not the defendant. 6 Therefore, since
he had voluntarily s7 testified at the hearing, and his testimony
was relevant and given under the guidance of counsel, it was permissible for the jury to have been apprised of its contents. To do
otherwise "would . . . be . . . to create a 'judicial amendment' to

the constitution to protect persons from the risks of errors of judgment in trial tactics."8
In United States v. Taylor,"9 a prosecution under the Internal
Revenue Code for gambling activities, the court ruled that even
though a movant for suppression is under a "justifiable impression" 0 that he must admit more than is necessary to establish the
requisite standing, his testimony may be used against him as a
voluntary admission against interest.9 1
resorted to these alternative means to establish standing, they too would
have been admissible under its ruling. Since the government intended to
use the contents of the suitcase against defendant to prove his implication in
the robbery charged, it would be expected to show that he had either
owned, purchased, possessed, or used the suitcase. If defendant had
elected not to testify, but had resorted to one or more of the alternative
methods suggested by the court to demonstrate his ownership or possession
in order to satisfy the standing requirements, it is difficult to see what he
could have gained from such a "tactic." Certainly he would have helped
the prosecution establish his implication in the robbery through such ownership or possession. This is all that the prosecution could have obtained
from the evidentiary use of the suitcase, and this is exactly what defendant established through his own testimony at the hearing. Thus, it
would appear that the court's ruling was not based primarily upon defendant's election to testify, but rather upon the premise that any evidence
offered at the hearing would have been admissible at trial.
86. 371 F.2d at 298.
87. The court interpreted defendant's election to testify as a waiver of
the privilege, because it noted that "he could not thereafter rely on the
fifth...." Id.
88. 371 F.2d at 299 (emphasis added); accord, United States v. Taylor,
326 F.2d 277, 279, 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964); Monroe
v. United States, 320 F.2d 277, 279-80 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
991 (1964); United States v. Lindsly, 7 F. Supp. 247, 255 (E.D. La. 1925),
rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1926); State v. Williams,
69 Ohio App. 361, 363, 41 N.E.2d 717, 718, appeal dismissed, 139 Ohio St.
172, 38 N.E.2d 410 (1941); Bell v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 266, 267-68, 250
S.W. 177, 178 (1923), writ of error dismissed, Bell v. Texas, 266 U.S. 640
(1924). In each of these cases, as in Heller, supression had been denied.
For critical comment on the court's failure in Garrett to adequately recognize the real issue, namely whether a defendant, to vindicate fourthamendment rights, must forego his privilege against self-incrimination, see
Note, 3 CiRM. L. BULL. 44-45 (Jan.-Feb. 1967).
89. 326 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
90. Id. at 280.
91. Id. Contra, United States v. Lewis, 270 F. Supp. 807, 810n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dictum endorsing a procedure by which a movant for suppression would be permitted to make admissions in order to be heard to
complain, "on the understanding that upon trial' of the charges the court
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Finally, in Monroe v. United States,92 a prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics, the court, while refusing to characterize
defendant's admissions as a confession, but recognizing that they
were inculpatory, sustained their use at trial. 93 This case serves
as an illustrative example of the dangers still facing a defendant
in a post-Jones 94 prosecution for possessory-contraband who mistakenly admits too much to effect standing.95
C. Authorities Conditionally Permitting (or Denying) Use at
Trial
The cases in this category have either conditionally permitted
or denied the trial use of suppression hearing admissions; that is,
they have conditioned such use upon the outcome of the hearing.
Thus, if the movant succeeds, his admissions fall with the evidence
suppressed; if he fails, however, then his admissions will be available to the prosecution along with the fruits of the search.
The leading authority in this class is Safarik v. United
States.9
Having been accused of violating the National Prohibition Act, defendants filed a motion to suppress evidence seized in
two searches. In the motion and supporting affidavits, they alleged
ownership of the liquor seized and admitted being the lessees of
the premises searched. Although the district court sustained the
motion as to the first search, it denied it as to the second. Consequently, the government made use of both the motion and the
affidavits at trial.
Recognizing the trial use of these documents as a "most serious
question" because they were "tantamount to a written confession
of guilt,"97 the Eighth Circuit, relying on the famous "shall not be

used at all" phrase coined by Mr. Justice Holmes, 98 reversed the
conviction on the ground that the admissions made were a direct
result of an unlawful search and seizure. 9 The court reasoned that
since defendants' right to privacy had been unreasonably invaded
by the first search, they were warranted in asserting this right by
such means as would prove to be effective. Thus, in order to make
their claim of an unwarranted invasion, they were compelled not
would not receive such admissions in evidence against him"). While
Lewis appears to be the only reported case to have unconditionally condemned the trial use of admissions made to effect standing, it did so by
means of obiter dicta and without any reference to constitutional infirmities.
92. 320 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 991 (1964).
93. Id. at 280.
94. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
95. See United States v. Taylor, 326 F.2d 277, 280 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
96. 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir.), reh. denied, 63 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1933).
97. Id. at 897.
98. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920).
99. 62 F.2d at 898.
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only to move to suppress, but to make the damaging admissions required for standing. If they were successful in suppressing the
fruits, but had to pay the price of making available to the prosecution admissions against interest, "then a rule of evidence, and
not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law
of the land. To so hold would render the constitution guaranties
sonorous but impotent phrases. ' 100 This would result in the indirect accomplishment of that which would not be directly permitted
to the prosecution, for in either event the privacy guaranteed by
the fourth amendment would be effectively invaded. 10 1 In concluding that the trial use of these documents constituted reversible
error, the Eighth Circuit called specific attention to the interplay
here between the right to privacy and the privilege against selfincrimination, and acknowledged that if the government's position
were sustained, a defendant would have to waive the latter to
practivindicate the former. In this setting a defendant, for0 all
2
cal purposes, would lose the benefit of both amendments.
The language adopted by the court in its first opinion clearly
intimated a general denouncement of the trial use of suppression
hearing admissions. In a second opinion,'0 3 however, published in
response to the government's filing of a motion for rehearing, the
court qualified this language by announcing that the basis for its
original opinion was the illegality of the first search.10 4 Although
in its first opinion the court made reference to the relation between
the fourth and fifth amendments, it did not base its ruling on this
interplay. Rather, it adopted the "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree" doctrine' 05 and let the subsequent use "ride with" the fruits of the
search.' 0 6
100. Id. at 897.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 897-98; accord, Wilkins v. United States, 258 F.2d 416, 418
(D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 942 (1958); Christensen v. United States, 259 F.2d 192, 197n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dissenting
opinion).
103. Safarik v. United States, 63 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1933).
104. Id. at 370. In so holding, the court distinguished Safarik from
Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 654
(1932), where it held that admissions against interest, made either in suppression motions or at suppression hearings, are admissible at trial. Although Kaiser did not stress the legality of the search attacked, the motion
to suppress had been denied.
105. First announced under this colorful phrase in Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), but having its antecedence in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). In this regard, it
should be noted that in the first opinion announced in Safarik, the court
laid heavy stress on Silverthorne. 62 F.2d at 898.
106. For critical appraisal of this approach adopted by the court under
the peculiar factual situation (only one motion to suppress had been filed,
and only one of the two searches had been struck down), and for endorsement of the court's apparent unconcern in its first opinion with the distinc-

tion based upon the legality or illegality of the search process, see Note,
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In elaborating on this approach in Fowler v. United States, 07
the Tenth Circuit observed that the cases denying trial admissibility were authoritative only where the motion had been successful,
and that all the courts passing upon this issue have favored admissibility where suppression has been denied. 0 8 This approach has
also been endorsed in forfeiture proceedings, when the prosecution
attempts to rely upon admissions made in an earlier criminal prosecution in which suppression had been ordered. 10 9
V.

SHOULD THE USE OF SUPPRESSION HEARING ADMISSIONS BE
PERMITTED AT TRIAL?

A. Some PracticalProblems of Suppression
In considering the trial use of admissions made to vindicate
fourth-amendment rights, a threefold problem arises: the exclusionary rule; the requirements of standing; and the privilege against
self-incrimination. To protect the right of privacy, a search victim
is permitted to exclude; to exclude, he must establish standing;
and to establish standing, he must run the risk of incrimination.
There is thus presented a functional interplay between the fourth
and fifth amendments-an interplay that each triggers in the procedural setting of a suppression motion or hearing. The relationship is functional, but not basic; therefore, each amendment has
an independent existence and retains this quality throughout the
course of any prosecution.
When approaching suppression, a movant operates under a dual
handicap. In the first place, he carries the burden of persuasion; 110
Standing To Object To An Unlawful Search And Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q.
488, 500. For agreement with this qualified use of standing admissions
see United States v. Airdo, 380 F.2d 103, 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 88
S. Ct 238 (1967) (court further observed that since defendant had voluntarily testified at trial concerning matters directly bearing on his innocence
or guilt, he could not then claim that the trial use of his suppression hearing admissions constituted an invasion of the privilege; additionally, it
limited Jones to possessory-contraband prosecutions); Fowler v. United
States, 239 F.2d 93, 95 (10th Cir. 1956); Fabri v. United States, 24 F.2d 185,
186 (9th Cir. 1928) (this case implicitly limited the unconditional use apparently endorsed in Vaught v. United States, 7 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1925));
Casias v. People, 415 P.2d 344, 348 (Colo.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 979 (1966);
State v. Portee, 46 N.J. 239, 241-42, 216 A.2d 227, 229 (1966) (dictum).
107. 239 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956).
108. Id. at 95; accord, Casias v. People, 415 P.2d 344, 348 (Colo.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 979 (1966). When suppression has been successful, Fowler
endorsed, as did Safarik, the "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree" doctrine implicit
in Silverthorne. 239 F.2d at 95.
109. E.g., Fabri v. United States, 24 F.2d 185, 186 (9th Cir. 1928).
110. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); United States v.
Morin, 378 F.2d 472, 475 (2d Cir. 1967); Addison v. United States, 317 F.2d
808, 812 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 905 (1964); Chin Kay v. United
States, 311 F.2d 317, 321 (9th Cir. 1962); Brandon v. United States, 270 F.2d
311, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1960); State v.
Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 91, 203 A.2d 305, 309 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943
(1965); State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 202, 203 A.2d 23, 30 (1964).
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secondly, he must overcome the presumption of legality.1 1' Nor
do his problems end here; if his claim is not timely pressed, he
will be deemed in 2the usual course of events to have waived his
right to complain.11
The defendant's attorney will also be operating under several
burdens, for he must approach the suppression hearing with the
knowledge that what is or is not an unreasonable search is a question of fact, 13 and that the status of search-and-seizure law is in
a state of flux. 1 1 4

In spite of this, counsel must be prepared to

111. Law enforcement officers are presumed to have acted legally, in
the absence of a prima facie showing of an illegal search and seizure.
United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1955); People v.
Pruitt, 155 Cal. App. 2d 585, 595, 318 P.2d 552, 559 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
People v. Holguin, 145 Cal. App. 2d 520, 522, 302 P.2d 635, 637 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956); State v. Brindley, 25 Conn. Supp. 216, 220, 200 A.2d 247, 249
(1963); see Rawls v. United States, 166 F.2d 532, 533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 848 (1948); Painter v. Peyton, 257 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Va. 1966).
There is even a stronger presumption of legality applying to a determination of probable cause made by a magistrate issuing a search warrant.
State v. Kasabucki, 96 N.J. Super. 173, 179, 232 A.2d 687, 691 (1967); see
Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 884 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Lewis, 270 F. Supp. 807, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In the related law of arrest,
if there is any evidence to justify an arrest, an appellate court should not
disturb a finding of reasonableness made by a trial court on a motion to
suppress. Echols v. State, 201 So. 2d 89, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
Therefore, since probable cause is the indispensable requisite of both a
reasonable arrest and a reasonable search, it is not difficult to perceive the
heavy burden of persuasion carried by a movant for suppression.
112. United States v. Paradise, 334 F.2d 748, 749 (3d Cir. 1964); United
States v. DiDonato, 301 F.2d 383, 384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917
(1962); Zachary v. United States, 275 F.2d 793, 795-96 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 816 (1960); United States v. Sheba Bracelets, Inc., 248 F.2d
134, 143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957); United States v.
Sansone, 231 F.2d 887, 892 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 987 (1956); cf.
United States v. Blythe, 325 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1963).
113. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
114. The following examples are sufficient to demonstrate this factor.
The "mere evidence" rule announced in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 309-11 (1921), was overruled in Warden v. Hayden, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1647,
1651 (1967). The rule announced in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699,
705-07 (1948), that a search should be conducted under benefit of a warrant where practicably obtainable, was overturned in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
366-67, 372-73 (1959), the Court held that the fourth amendment does not
require a search warrant for an administrative health inspection of private
premises. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 1733 (1967),
the Court ruled that a warrant was so required. The exclusionary rule,
held inapplicable to the states in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914), and reaffirmed in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), was held
applicable in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). In commenting upon
the prior consistency of Supreme Court decisions passing upon the permissible scope of incidental searches, probably the most "popular" search
among police officers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter made this comment: "The
several cases on this subject in this Court cannot be satisfactorily reconciled.
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take all legal steps that will reasonably protect the interests of his
client. 115 In any prosecution for illegal possession, or in any close
case involving prosecutorial use of incriminating evidence,1 16 the
practitioner must think in terms of a potentially illegal search or
seizure. To do otherwise would be to forego any chance of obtainbe prepared to
ing a favorable result for his client. He must also
"make" new law, or at least to refine existing law. 117
After making an investigation and determining therefrom the
existence of a possible illegal search or seizure, the next step for
the defense attorney is the filing of a motion to suppress. It is
at this point that the dilemma in question arises, because he must
allege enough to obtain standing, but not so much as to incur incrimination. Even if these obstacles can be hurdled, he must give
attention to what is probably the greatest source of danger to his
client: the latter's own testimony. The practitioner must weigh
the relative merits and disadvantages involved in permitting his
client to testify in support of the motion. If he permits testimony,
it has the dual advantage of presenting the "whole picture" to the
hearing judge, not just that offered by the arresting or searching
officer, and it will probably go farther than any other evidence to
satisfy his client's burden of persuasion.11 8 On the other hand, it
will expose him severely to the risk of incrimination. Once the
movant takes the stand, he will not be permitted to tell a partial
This problem has, as is well-known, provoked strong and fluctuating dif-

ferences of view on the Court." Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235
(1960) (emphasis added).
115. Not only do the Canons of Professional Ethics require this, ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 5, but the courts themselves will move
to set aside convictions on the sole ground of ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel; such deficiencies amount to a denial of due process, see,
e.g., Dyer v. United States, 379 F.2d 89, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Lollar v. United
States, 376 F.2d 243, 244, 247-48 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Cavell,
423 Pa. 387, 393-94, 224 A.2d 616, 619-20 (1966).
116. These, of course, will include any confession or inculpatory statement proximately derived from or induced by an arrest or search and
seizure. See Hoffa v. United States, 87 S. Ct. 408, 413 (1966); Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12
(1961); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 449-50, 380 P.2d 658, 659, 30
Cal. Rptr. 18, 19 (1963) (same prohibition applies to any testimony flowing.
from an illegal search or seizure).
117. A good argument can be made for the proposition that this is
exactly what the Supreme Court accomplishes in each of its decisions.
But before it can succeed in this, the services of the defense attorney are
required to initiate the process.
118. For an excellent example of the dangers inherent in not presenting the whole picture, see United States ex rel. Anderson v. Rundle, 274 F.
Supp. 364, 367, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1967). In the analogous undertaking involving suppression of involuntary statements, one court in dictum referred to
a defendant's failure to testify as all but making it "a fact-reality" that
he would not be able to sustain his burden of persuasion. Woody v. United
States, 379 F.2d 130, 131n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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story. His disclosure must be complete, even though it may subject him to other prosecutions. 119 Thus, both the client and his
counsel face a dilemma. If counsel does not move to suppress, he
may practically concede conviction. If he does move, and fails,
then he makes available to the prosecutor the most incriminating
120
evidence of all-that which comes from the very lips of the client.
This, then, is the setting in which the right of privacy and the
121
privilege against self-incrimination "run almost into each other."'
B.

Two Attempted Solutions which have been Proposed

Two solutions to the dilemma posed by the trial use of suppression hearing admissions have been proposed. Both of them,
unfortunately, must fail; and each for a different reason-the first,
because it violates "procedural orderliness"; 12 2 the second, because
it is at best a partial solution.
1. Suppression at Trial
The first solution suggests that an accused first move to suppress at the trial itself after the prosecution has established either
ownership or possession, the normally indispensable requirements
for standing. The accused
would acquire standing through the
1 23
prosecution's own proof.
There are two obstacles to this approach. In the first place,
as has been noted, 124 suppression is a procedural device for the enforcement of substantive rights. It is either a creature of statute
or a rule of court. As such, the mechanics for setting it in motion
usually require strict compliance. 2 5 Invariably these ground rules,
in specifying a time limit, require that the motion be filed prior
to trial. 26 The reasons for this have been aptly put:
In the interest of normal procedural orderliness, a motion
to suppress . . . must be made prior to trial, if the defend-

119. See authorities cited note 56 supra.
120. It is certainly unrealistic to argue, as has been done, e.g., Note,
supra note 106, at 502, that if a prosecutor successfully opposes suppression,
he will not need or use the admissions made therein. A resourceful prosecutor will rarely, if ever, pass up the opportunity to use inculpatory statements.
121. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
122. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960).
123. For authorities advocating this solution, which implicitly concedes
the trial use of admissions made in suppression hearings, see Brandon v.
United States, 270 F.2d 311, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1960); Christensen v. United States, 259 F.2d 192, 199
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion), Williams v. United States, 237 F.2d 789
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Wyche v. United States, 193 F.2d 703, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(concurring opinion), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 921 (1952).
124. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
125. Cf.Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960).
126. E.g., FED. R. CRim. P. 41 (e).
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ant then has knowledge of the grounds on which to base
the motion ....

This . . . is designed to eliminate from

the trial disputes over police12conduct
not immediately rele7
vant to the question of guilt.
Secondly, counsel should remember that in passing upon the
timeliness of a 41(e) motion, the federal courts have consistently
held that unless a movant comes within one of the two conditions
therein specified, his motion to suppress at trial not only comes
too late, but also has the effect of waiving his fourth amendment
right to complain. 128 Faced with such respectable authority, a defense attorney would be foolhardy to wait for trial before raising
fourth-amendment objections. Although 41(e) does permit a
court "discretion" to entertain the motion at trial, the circumstances demanded
would have to be sufficiently critical to prevent
29
an "injustice.'
Not only is this proposed solution defective because it violates the requirement of timeliness and exposes the movant to the
penalty of waiver, but, as is true of the second proposal, it is deficient for being only partially effective. To allow an accused to
move for suppression at trial might protect him from accusing
himself in his motion and supporting papers, but it will not insulate him from oral testimonial incrimination that may result
from the attempt to accomplish suppression. A motion at trial
obviates the danger of incrimination implicit in the requirements
for standing, but it is irrelevant to the issue of permitting use of
testimonial incrimination. This is the critical issue that has not
been resolved in this attempted solution.

127. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960), wherein the Court
interpreted the time requirements contained in rule 41 (e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341-42 (1939).
128. See cases cited note 112 supra.
129. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960). The Court alluded
to such an example when it observed that in contraband prosecutions the
prosecution should choose between opposing a pretrial motion to suppress
and basing its case on possession. In such cases, the Court recognized the
discretionary entertainment at trial of motions to suppress. Id. at 265n.l.
To permit the prosecution to successfully oppose suppression for lack of
possessory-standing, and then allow it to secure a conviction for possession,
would be to subject "the defendant to the penalties meted out to one in
lawless possession while refusing him the remedies designed for one in that
situation." Id. at 263. Except for the concern expressed for possessorycontraband prosecutions, there is nothing in the Court's opinion to indicate
a general or even discretionary endorsement of hearing suppression motions at trial. This silence could intimate a disfavor for broadly permitted
suppression at trial.
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Suppression Based Upon the "Fruit-of-the-Poisonous-Tree"
Doctrine
'1 3
The "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree,"' 130 or "primary taint,

doc-

trine had its antecedence in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 32 where Mr. Justice Holmes inveighed against any use "at
all" of evidence illegally seized or obtained. 3s Simply stated, the
doctrine forbids not only the use of such evidence, but also the use
of any knowledge derived therefrom to produce other evidence of
guilt. 134

There can be no causal connection between illegally ob-

tained evidence and the prosecution's proof unless "such connection
[has] become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. ' 3' 5 In applying the doctrine a court need not rule all evidence inadmissible
simply because it would not have come to light but for illegal
activity on the part of law enforcement officials. Rather, the
of the doctrine is the presence or
test for determining a violation
136
absence of exploitation.
Some courts have utilized the doctrine to argue that if a movant for suppression is successful, any damaging admissions made
by him in accomplishing suppression should fall with the fruits
of the search. 3 7 Although this use of the doctrine has been questioned on the ground that there is usually a considerable interval
between the search and the admissions made to accomplish suppression, 138 one which may make the connection "so attenuated
130 Colorfully designated as such in Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1941).
131. E.g., People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 572, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266,
273 (1965).
132. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
133. Id. at 392.

134. For excellent examples of the doctrine's application see United
States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964), and United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 487-88, 489 (2d Cir. 1962).
135. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1941); see MAGUIRE,
EVIDENCE oF GUILT 221 (1959).
136. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
137. See, e.g., Fowler v. United States, 239 F.2d 93, 95 (10th Cir. 1956);
Safarik v. United States, 63 F.2d 369, 370 (8th Cir. 1933); Fabri v. United
States, 24 F.2d 185, 186 (9th Cir. 1928). See also Wilkins v. United States,
258 F.2d 416, 418 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 942
(1958); Casias v. Colorado, 415 P.2d 344, 348 (Colo.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
979 (1966); State v. Portee, 46 N.J. 239, 241-42, 216 A.2d 227, 229 (1966)
(dictum).
138. Note, supra note 106, at 501. But in considering this objection,
it should be remembered that the element of time has never been critical
per se to the application of the doctrine. Although time can have some or
even a strong bearing in a particular situation, the critical factor is exploitation. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 491 (1963).
Not only is the element of time usually irrelevant to the applicability
of the doctrine, but it is particularly unrealistic in the procedural setting of
suppression. For example, it is possible for a search to considerably antedate an arrest, which usually initiates a prosecution. See, e.g., Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d
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as to dissipate the taint," there are more basic objections to its employment to deny trial use.
Although there is a certain facile logic in this approach, it will
not withstand close examination. In the first place, it renders irrelevant the issue of voluntariness, which is the touch-stone for
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. 8 9 Secondly, it
confounds a search and seizure with the privilege, which, as has
been noted, 14 0 has an independent existence and function of its
own. For example, since the "fruits" doctrine has no application to
reasonable search activity, then conversely it can justify the trial
use of inculpatory statements made at a hearing in which suppression was denied; if there can be no permitted use when the search
process has been invalidated, there should be such use when the
process has received judicial approbation. The net effect is to confuse the search process with both the procedural mechanics of
suppression and the protection afforded by the privilege. Therefore, the exercise of the14privilege
should not be dependent upon
1
the legality of the search.
486, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1962).

A considerable interval between an arrest and

the obtainment of counsel is also possible. Some further period of time must
be allotted to counsel to reasonably investigate the existence of a searchand-seizure issue. If he should determine such existence, presumably he
will make a motion to suppress. Counsel will probably experience some
delay, however, before the motion can come on for a hearing at which, for
the first time, a testimonial admission may be made. To say that this total
interval has "dissipated the taint" is to penalize a search victim for the
not-always-orderly processes of the criminal law. It is better, and far more
realistic, to examine the activities of the police between the search and
the date of the hearing than to simply measure the time interval involved.
If the police sit back and make no attempt to independently "come at" the
evidence or information previously obtained from or as a result of the
search, MAGUIRE, supra note 135, at 221, or if they endeavor to exploit their
original illegality, then the doctrine will apply; e.g., United States v. Tane,
329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964). Conversely, when there is no exploitation,
or where the police succeed in independently "coming at" the evidence or
information, the doctrine is inapplicable. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); United States v. Paroutian, supra
at 489.
The commentator did recognize, however, that the element of time may
not be relevant to the application of the doctrine in suppression hearings
because the admissions required in such a setting are made for the enforcement of fourth-amendment rights and are not, therefore, voluntary. Note,
supra note 106, at 501.
139. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
140. See notes 66-74 supra and accompanying text.
141. In like manner, the legality of the search, except where search
activity has actually invaded the privilege, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden,
87 S.Ct. 1642, 1648 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633, 635 (1886); People v. Ellis, 65 A.C. 571,
421 P.2d 393, 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1966), should not be dependent
upon the privilege. Comment, The Fourth And Fifth Amendments-Dimensions Of An "Intimate Relationship," 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 857, 865 (1966).
Since a search and seizure will survive or fall on its own, the concept of
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The final objection to utilization of the "fruits" doctrine is
that it has no relevancy to suppression motions that fail. In that
eventuality, both the evidence seized and the statements made
in support of suppression will be available to the prosecution at
trial. The doctrine thus affords protection only to a successful
movant, and leaves the unsuccessful one completely vulnerable to
whether they appear
the damaging use at trial of his statements,
14 2
in pleading or oral testimonial form.
C.

Why Trial Use should Not be Permitted

Nothing can be more damaging to an accused than incriminating evidence which he himself makes available to the prosecution.
Although the trier may not place great credence in self-serving
declarations or professions of innocence, he cannot help but be impressed by inculpatory statements. Since it is more natural for
any individual to protect than to incriminate himself, when he
accomplishes the latter, its very unnaturalness will lend it a greater
ring of truth than could possibly attach to any protestations of
innocence. 43 In view of this, it is crucial for an accused as well as
reasonableness under the fourth amendment has nothing to do with either
standing to object or inculpatory statements made at suppression hearings.
Hence, if official search conduct meets the standards of reasonableness
demanded by the amendment, the fruits thereof should be independently
admissible, State v. 'Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 510-11, 213 A.2d 185, 188 (1965),
provided, of course, that they satisfy the additional requirement of relevancy.
142. It has been argued that the dilemma will rarely exist under the
"fruits" or "primary taint" approach, because if the motion is successful,
the statements will fall with the evidence seized; and, if it fails, the prosecution's case will usually be so strong as not to require the use of the
statements. Note, supra note 106, at 501-02. The validity of this argument
cannot be denied in possessory-contraband cases, in which mere unexplained possession is enough to convict. For this reason the police, in this
type of prosecution, rarely resort to obtaining confessions. If suppression
fails in possessory cases, the damage ensuing from subsequent use of the
statements will probably be minimal, without regard to reliance upon the
"fruits" doctrine. This line of reasoning will not pass muster in nonpossessory prosecutions, however, in which the evidence sought to be suppressed usually forms only a link with the crime charged. It is in this type
of case, as has been recently demonstrated, that the use of the statements
can be most damaging, for their use will be sought to establish the "fatal
link" between the accused and the evidence seized. This is the second, and
critical, link sought by the prosecution, for it connects the accused with the
evidence seized, which in turn is connected with the offense charged. See,
e.g., Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14, Simmons v. United States, 87
S.Ct. 2108 (1967).
143. Although it is true that compelled incrimination will receive an
opposite interpretation, because the inhumaneness of the methods used to
force incrimination will make a court distrustful of evidence thereby extracted, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), and because it would hurt the innocent as well as the guilty, Entick v. Carrington,
2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 1073 (C.P.
1765), thereby violating one of the basic functions of the privilege-the
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his counsel to know whether any statements made by him in support of his attempt to vindicate rights guaranteed under the fourth
amendment can be used against him at trial on the theory that they
constituted a waiver of his fifth-amendment privilege against selfincrimination. The determination of this question revolves around
the issue of compulsion. In short, when the accused communicates
oral or written information to establish standing to complain and
to show that his right to privacy has been unreasonably invaded,
has he been compelled to do so?
If an attempt is made to penalize an accused for remaining
silent,'4 4 or if he is maneuvered into a position where he feels
required to speak, or is pressured into speaking, then the privilege
has been violated. 145 Although he has an absolute right to speak,
thereby waiving the privilege,1 46 he must be permitted to do so in
the "unfettered exercise of his own will." Any official activity
which necessitates a communicative response from the accused will
trigger the application of the privilege. This is exactly what takes
place when an accused attempts to secure the benefits of the fourth
amendment.
When one accused of crime moves to suppress, he questions
not the relevancy or reliability of the evidence seized,' 47 but rather
the methods by which it was obtained. These methods, however,
are "not immediately relevant to the question of guilt.' 48 Therefore, when he testifies to establish their illegality, he is not doing
so, as he would at trial, as a witness in his own behalf on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Rather, he testifies for the limited purpose of protecting a specific constitutional right. There is
here, then, no waiver of the privilege, as there would be in the
normal setting of a trial where an accused freely offered himself
as a witness in his own behalf.
protection of innocent men, Gruenwald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421
(1957); GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 9-30, 53-82 (1955), there
can be little doubt that great attention will be given to inculpatory evidence voluntarily produced. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rose, 235 A.2d 462,
464 (Pa. Super. 1967), where the court in concluding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant noted that the informer
relied upon had made a self-incriminating statement to the officer seeking
the warrant. This factor was deemed to have argued for the reliability of
the information given.
144. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613, 614, 615 (1965);
Spevack v. Klein, 87 S. Ct. 625, 627, 628 (1967).
145. The Supreme Court has admonished that the privilege is fulfilled
only when the individual is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer
no penalty . . . for such silence." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)
(emphasis added); accord, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
146. See authorities cited note 56 supra.
147. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
The Court has
148. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960).
further noted that the exclusionary rule "has no bearing on guilt." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638 (1965).
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Furthermore, the settings are entirely different. At trial, the
burden of proof rests with the prosecution, and the accused is
presumed to be innocent; at suppression hearings, the burden of
persuasion is on the accused, and the police are presumed to have
acted lawfully. 149 Nor does the distinction stop here; for in suppression the accused will not even be heard to complain until he
satisfies certain judge-made rules of standing. Thus, potential incrimination assumes any of three forms. It can spring from an
attempt to effect standing; from an attempt to satisfy the burden
of persuasion; or from an attempt to overcome the persumption
of legality. These rules of standing, as well as those of evidence
governing burden of proof and presumption of legality, are not of
the accused's choosing. 150 He neither created nor refined them
and hence has no say in their operation. His responsibility is to
comply with or to overcome them, as the case may be. To designate the accused's endeavor to comply as a waiver of the privilege
is to distort the meaning of "waiver," which is nothing less than
the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. 51' There is certainly nothing voluntary about an admission made to secure standing, or stemming from a dual attempt to satisfy the burden of
proof and to overcome the presumption of legality. It is in this
sense that testimony at suppression hearings differs radically from
that at trial, where all the presumptions operate in favor of the
accused and the burden of persuasion is carried by the prosecution. At trial, the accused is compelled to do nothing. At suppression hearings, he is compelled to do everything.
Not only practical considerations cry out against the trial use
of suppression hearing admissions. The Constitution itself stands
as the ultimate bulwark against their use; for to permit it would
be to sanction an invasion of both the fourth and fifth amendments. The fourth would be invaded because a potential movant
for suppression would be reluctant to invoke its protection once
he realized that he might end up in a worse position than he was
in prior to suppression, at which time the only evidence available
to the prosecution consisted of items seized as a result of a
search. 5 2 Likewise, the fifth would be invaded because such use
149. See authorities cited notes 110 & 111 supra.
150. One scholar has argued that the requirement of standing represents an example of judicial distaste for the exclusionary rule. See
Edwards, Standing to Suppress UnreasonablySeized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L.
REV. 471, 472 (1952).
151. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 378 F.2d 398,
399 (3d Cir. 1967). As noted, courts will indulge all reasonable presumptions against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. See Carnley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 514 (1962); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
70 (1942).
152. A striking example of this was recently presented in United States
v. Garrett, 371 F.2d 296, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. granted sub noma.
Simmons v. United States, 87 S. Ct. 2108 (1967). Prior to suppression, the
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would constitute an exploitation of communicative evidence provided by the accused because of the necessity to satisfy the requirements for standing; to discharge the burden of persuasion; and
to overcome the presumption of legality. These burdens will compel the accused to offer himself, at least on some occasions,15 3 as
4
a witness."
Although trial use may cause only minimal harm in possessorycontraband cases, 155 this can never serve as a valid basis for permitting the same. The enforcement of basic constitutional privileges should not hinge on the quality or character of the offense
charged. They are not practical "formalities,"'156 and should never
be so conceived. Furthermore, if use is sanctioned in contraband
cases, it would have to be approved in all cases. To determine
use on the basis of the offense charged is to create the anomalous
situation in which the presence of rights becomes totally irrelevant
to the issue of their infringement. In short, the issue becomes
subordinated to the offense and is thereby effectively sidetracked.
government had in its possession a suitcase containing some of the loot
taken in the bank robbery charged. After suppression had been denied,
the government was permitted to use not only the suitcase and its contents,
but also defendant's admission of ownership, which established "the fatal
link identifying him with the suitcase and its contents." Petitioner's Brief
for Certiorari at 14 (emphasis added). To say the least, defendant found
himself in a worse position than existed prior to suppression.
153. See Note, supra note 106, at 503.
154. It is unrealistic to penalize an accused for testifying when there
are other means available to establish the validity of his claim of illegal
search conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 371 F.2d 296, 298 (7th
Cir. 1966), cert. granted sub nom. Simmons v. United States, 87 S. Ct. 2108
(1967). As any defense attorney knows, it will be extremely difficult to
obtain a verdict of not guilty if his client does not take the stand. If this
be true at trial, where the burden of persuasion rests with the prosecution,
it must be at least as viable at a suppression hearing, where the burden
lies with the client. For the same reason, he should not be penalized for
offering "too much" evidence in support of his motion. See, e.g., United
States v. Taylor, 326 F.2d 277, 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931
(1964). How can counsel safely say what is "too much" when he is faced
with the triple burden of standing, persuasion, and presumption? His
function is to advocate, not to rule. To accomplish this, he must be accorded the unhampered advocacy of his client's constitutional rights.
155. It may be safely assumed that if suppression is properly denied,
the accused will change his plea and try to effect the best "deal" available.
If denial is improper, however, and a successful appeal is taken, the
accused, under the authorities permitting unconditional use, will still be
faced with the danger of use at a second trial. E.g., Heller v. United
States, 57 F.2d 627, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 567 (1932). See also
authorities cited note 80 supra.
156. This is certainly true of fourth-amendment rights, McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948), which are no less important than
others provided in the Bill of Rights. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
656 (1961); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); cf. Berger v.
New York, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 1878 (1967). Both they and those under the
fifth "should be liberally construed in favor of the individual." Safarik v.
United States, 62 F.2d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 1933).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Certain solutions to the dilemma posed have been proposed,
but have been found wanting in one or more particulars. This is
also true of the suggestion that the requirement of standing be
eliminated. 157 This proposal fails, as do the others, because it offers
only partial protection. Although it protects against the use of
admissions contained in the motion itself, as well as in any supporting papers, it affords no protection against the use of oral
testimonial admissions-the very type that may prove to be the
most damaging of all. The workable and effective solution is a
total ban, with one exception," 8s on the subsequent use of admissions required for the enforcement of rights guaranteed under the
fourth amendment.
An additional reason why such admissions should not be used,
regardless of the outcome of suppression, is because the searchand-seizure process is usually if not invariably employed as a means
of avoiding encroachment upon the privilege against self-incrimination.159 If the police have eyewitnesses to the commission of a
crime, the search-and-seizure process should not be crucial to a
successful prosecution. When such witnesses are lacking, however,
then a case must be built, at least initially, upon circumstantial
evidence. To link a suspect directly with the crime, the police
have an option. Either they take the suspect into custody and
attempt to "produce the evidence against him . . . by the cruel,
157. For authorities proposing this solution see Comment, Standing To
Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 342,
365-66 (1967); Note, Standing To Object To An Unlawful Search And
Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488, 519-20.
158. That exception will be when the accused, on direct examination
at trial, contradicts his suppression hearing testimony on matters collateral
to the issue of guilt. E.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954);
United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873
(1966); People v. Luna, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 306, 226 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1967) (it is
improper, where a motion to suppress a confession has been sustained, to
impeach a defendant at trial by use of his suppression hearing testimony,
where such testimony is the same or substantially similar to the confession).
See Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Inge v.
United States, 356 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Of course, if a confession
is involuntary, it may not be resorted to for any purpose. See Gaertner v.
State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 169, 150 N.W.2d 370, 377 (1967) and authorities
cited therein.
The basis for the exception is that the accused may not "affirmatively
resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability
[created by the exclusionary rule] to challenge his credibility." Walder v.
United States, supra at 65. However, the prosecution will not be permitted, after eliciting a denial of prior possession or ownership on crossexamination, to discredit the accused by showing an inconsistency through
the proffer of illegally seized evidence. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 35 (1925).
159. The dubious possibility that law enforcement officials will intentionally violate the fourth amendment as bait to entice the unwary victim
of an illegal search or seizure into incriminating himself may be safely

discounted.
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simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth," 160 thereby
exposing themselves to the constitutional deficiencies necessarily
inherent in such procedures, or they resort to the search process.
Because a search does not require active conduct on the part of
its victim, and does not demand a prior warning of constitutional
rights,1 ' it would seem to be the safer procedure for the police
to follow.
In view of all this, it would be an act of supreme irony to permit to the prosecution the very windfall of admissibility which it
attempted to avoid by resorting to the search process. To say that
the police may not incriminate directly, but may do so indirectly
by "cruel, simple expedient" of sitting back and waiting for the
accused, after compelling him to speak, is to make a mockery of
the privilege. Surely it cannot be doubted that when a search
victim is compelled to speak up in defense of his fourth-amendment right of privacy, "some attempt [has been] made to secure
a communication . . . upon which reliance is to be placed as in-

volving his consciousness of the facts and the operations of his
1 62
mind in expressing it."'

Finally, because a search and seizure and the privilege against
self-incrimination are basically dissimilar, the trial use of suppression hearing admissions should never hinge upon the outcome of
the hearing. Even if it is judicially determined that there has
been no unreasonable search activity, this determination has no
bearing upon whether the privilege has been violated in the search
victim's attempt to secure the protection of the fourth amendment.
Just as the fourth can be violated without regard to the fifth, so
can the fifth be violated in the absence of an infringement upon
the fourth.
It is therefore submitted that since any suppression hearing
admissions, in either oral or documentary form, which are
prompted by an attempt to vindicate rights secured under the
fourth amendment, will have the effect of being coerced or compelled within the ambit of the privilege secured under the fifth;
and since such admissions will invariably prove to be of the most
damaging variety, their use at trial other than for impeachment
purposes should never be permitted, regardless of the success or
failure of suppression.
CONCLUSION

If an accused is permitted to testify at a preliminary hearing
to the involuntariness of his confession, without thereby waiving
his privilege against self-incrimination, 16 3 the same result should
160.
161.
Miranda
162.
163.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
Morgan v. State, 234 A.2d 762, 763 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967); cf.
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
8 WIGMORE § 2265, at 386 (3d ed.,1940) (emphasis added).
E.g., Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1957); 3
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obtain when he testifies to vindicate his fourth-amendment rights.
To permit trial use of any admissions he is required to make is to
compel an accused to forfeit one constitutional right as the price
for vindication of another. Such a pernicious doctrine falls within
the broad ambit of moral compulsion prohibited under the fifthamendment privilege against self-incrimination'6 4 and should never
receive the sanction of the courts.' 65
It was never the purpose or function of the exclusionary rule,
"an essential part of the right to privacy,""', to serve as a vehicle
for self-incrimination. Its primary purpose has been, and remains,
to make that privacy effective. To frustrate through self-incrimination the victim of a search and seizure in his endeavors to take
advantage of the "means for making effective the protection of
privacy"' 1 67 is to subvert this purpose.

WI GmORE § 860, at 345 (3d ed. 1940); see Harrison v. United States, 36
U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1967), where the Court has agreed to decide if
self-incriminating statements made in court by a defendant in an attempt
to explain a confession may be used in a subsequent trial, after an appellate
court has ruled the confession inadmissible. The rationale seems to be
that a defendant's testimony is indispensable to his claim of involuntariness. See Woody v. United States, 379 F.2d 130, 131n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
3 WIGMORE § 860, at 344-45 (3d ed. 1940). Therefore, since a movant's testimony is at least as critical to his claim of unreasonableness, and since an
unreasonable search and seizure is "tantamount to coerced testimony,"
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), the same rule of inadmissibility
should apply to testimonial admissions, in both oral and documentary
form, made in support of suppression. This is especially true when it is
realized that in each instance the same result is being sought: the suppression of evidence claimed to have been unconstitutionally obtained.
See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (if an accused takes the stand in a non-jury hearing to render inadmissible prior
convictions, his testimony will not be later admissible except for purposes
of impeachment); cf. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 640 (4th Cir.
1967) (since exercising a privilege provided by law cannot be conditioned
upon the waiver of a constitutional right, an accused, by taking an appeal,
does not thereby waive his right to be free of a greater sentence on retrial).
164. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
165. Accord, Edwards, supra note 150, at 486-88, 491; Note, supra note
157, at 500, 503, 504, 516, 519.
166. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
167. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).

